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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a civil action for damages 
alleged to have been proximately caused by the defendant's 
negligence. 
Jurisdiction of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, from which this appeal arises is based on UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(1) (1953, as amended). 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon 
the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (j) 
(1953, as amended). 
Judgment of the trial court was entered on the 5th 
day of March, 1991, and Appellants' Notice of Appeal was filed 
with the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, on the 2nd day 
of April, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting 
demonstrative evidence which was irrelevant and misleading? 
II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing 
defense counsel to solicit the injection of evidence that the 
plaintiff had received workers' compensation benefits as a 
result of the accident in question? 
1 
III. Whether the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence of conduct indicating an admission of liability 
because the admission was inseparably intertwined with 
evidence of the defendant's possession of liability insurance? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Standard of review of evidentiary rulings by the trial 
court turns upon abusive discretion by the trial court where 
the admission or exclusion of evidence is based upon relevancy 
verses probative value. However, where the question of 
admissibility is one of law, the issue may by directly 
reviewed by the appellate court and reversed where the judge 
commits a clear error of law. (See eg. Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Bart lev. 784 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Larsen. 775 
P.2d 415 (Utah 1989) ) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Subsequent to an accident involving the parties on 
or about the 18th day of June, 1987, at approximately one mile 
West of the junction of SR-189 and SR-92, in Utah County, 
State of Utah, the plaintiff, Douglas E. Butts, brought a 
claim against the defendant for personal injury and damages 
2 
which he suffered as a result of the defendant's alleged 
negligence. 
That trial was held on February 11, 1991 through 
February 14, 1991. On or about August 21, 1987, the plaintiff 
filed the above-referenced action against the defendant. The 
plaintiff's complaint alleged that the resulting personal 
injuries and damages were proximately caused by the 
defendant's negligent action of crossing over the center 
dividing line forcing the plaintiff to swerve off the road to 
avoid a collision with the defendant. 
On or about February 13th, 1991, the court held a 
hearing outside the presence of the jury, during which the 
court entertained oral arguments as to the admissability of 
certain video tapes depicting the road traveled by the parties 
preceding, subsequent to, and at the accident site. The court 
excluded certain segments of a video tape produced by Greg 
Duval because they did not depict the circumstances as they 
existed at the time of the accident, and admitted only those 
portions of the video tape showing sections of the road prior 
to the section of Cannon road involved in the accident. The 
admitted sections of the Duval tape were admitted as 
illustrative of what the circumstances were and the type of 
curve the parties experienced. (Ibid, at page 48, line 1-25) 
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During trial certain proceedings were held to decide 
whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by permitted questioning 
from defense counsel which led to the injection of evidence 
that the plaintiff had received workers1 compensation 
benefits, and also whether the plaintiff should be allowed to 
question the defendant as to actions which indicated an 
admission of liability when such actions concern the 
defendant's possession of liability insurance. The court 
decided, in the former issue, that no mention of amount had 
been made in regards to already recovered benefits, and it was 
therefore not prejudicial. (See Abstracts From Transcript of 
Trial: Comprising proceedings had outside the presence of the 
jury, page 10, line 12-17). Counsel for plaintiff made a 
formal objection to this decision. (See Abstract From 
Transcript of Trial: comprising proceedings held outside the 
presence of the jury, page 9, line 17-22) 
Furthermore, the court decided that if proposed 
testimony concerning the defendant's switching of liability 
insurance went to prove that the defendant, at the time, "knew 
or suspected or felt that he had some liability and was 
attempting to take and do something to shield him from that," 
that it was relevant and should be admitted. (Ibid, at page 
6, line 14-22) However, the court, during proceedings on 
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the 13th day of February, 1991, decided that the prejudice 
outweighed the possible probativeness of the evidence sought 
to be admitted. 
On March 5th, 1991 final judgment was rendered 
indicating no negligence on either party. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about the 18th day of June, 1987, at 
approximately one mile West of the junction of Sr-189 and SR-
92, in Utah County, State of Utah, the defendant, Gary Laney, 
drove and operated a motor vehicle traveling downhill in a 
southerly direction; (See Complaint, page 1, paragraph 1-3) 
Simultaneously, the plaintiff was traveling uphill in a 
northerly direction on a motorcycle. The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant crossed the center dividing line at a bend 
in the road and in response the plaintiff swerved off the road 
into some rock outcroppings suffering physical injury and 
property damage. (See Complaint, page 2, paragraph 4 and 5) 
The plaintiff's injuries necesitated multiple spinal 
surgeries. He was left with severe neurological impairments 
and a disability of whole person rating of forty-nine (49) 
percent. (See generally deposition of Dr. Gaufin) 
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The plaintiff brought a complaint for the resulting 
physical injury and property damage based on the alleged 
negligence of the defendant in crossing the center line and 
forcing the plaintiff to avoid head-on collision. (See 
generally plaintiff's complaint) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Irrelevant and misleading evidence is inadmissible 
and should be excluded. The Duval reconstruction video 
depicting the road preceding the section of road where the 
accident occurred was both irrelevant and inadmissable and 
should have been excluded as a matter of law. 
The above-mentioned video tape was irrelevant in 
that it did not have any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. The preceding road does not establish the fact of 
tightness, elevation, or visual impairments of the relevant 
curve. 
Furthermore, the admitted video tape was misleading 
in that it was filmed at a different height, speed, and from 
a different position in the road than that which the parties 
actually experienced. These variations instilled in the minds 
of the jury a strong, distorted, and misleading impression of 
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what the parties actually viewed. As a matter of law, courts 
have excluded demonstrative evidence which is distorted and 
misleading. 
For example, photographic evidence which is taken of 
a location other than the relevant scene, and used as 
illustrative of the actual scene, must be substantially 
similar to the actual location. In the case at bar the 
evidence of the preceding road, admitted on the grounds that 
it was indicative of the type of curve experienced by the 
parties, is not similar to the actual s-curve, and no attempt 
by the court was made to determine if it was substantially 
similar to warrant the admission of such evidence. 
The second error made involves the trial court 
allowing defense counsel to circumvent the well established 
collateral source rule by pursuing a line of questioning which 
revealed the plaintiff's already recovered workers1 
compensation benefits from the relevant accident. 
It is apparent from the information which defense 
counsel possessed concerning workers' compensation benefits 
that this line of questioning would elicit a response 
revealing already received benefits. Also, defense counsel 
and the court were warned that this questioning would, and in 
fact did, elicit the injection of damaging evidence concerning 
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workers1 compensation benefits. Such evidence instills in the 
jury's minds that the injured party has already received 
benefits and may be undeserving of further compensation. 
Finally, the trial court erred in disallowing 
evidence of an admission of liability because it was 
inseparably linked with evidence of liability insurance. 
There are numerous exceptions to the rule prohibiting 
admission of liability insurance that are established both 
statutorily and judicially. One such exception is that 
evidence as to liability insurance is admissible when such 
evidence is inseparably intertwined with an admission of 
liability. Such admissions of liability have not been 
restricted to oral admissions, but may included conduct which 
clearly indicates such an admission. 
The defendant's conduct consists of a quick change 
of liability insurance in mid policy period just after the 
accident, an unfounded explanation for such a prompt switch, 
and an attempt to misinform as to the actual time in which the 
switch was made. These facts, examined closely, are an 
admission of liability and should not have been excluded. 
Disallowing the admission of such evidence hindered the 
plaintiff in proving his theory of the case. 
For the above-mentioned reasons the plaintiff was 
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prejudiced and the trial court should grant a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE 
WHICH IS IRRELEVANT AND MISLEADING. 
Utah Rules of Evidence state that "Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible." The courts admission of the 
Duval video tape depicting the road prior to the section of 
road where the accident occurred is irrelevant and should have 
been so excluded. Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence (1974, as 
amended). In addition to the irrelevancy of this section of 
video tape, any possible probative value was outweighed by the 
prejudicially misleading effect it had on the jury. Rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1991). "Relevant evidence means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971, as 
amended). 
The central fact in dispute in this case is whether 
the defendant did or did not cross the center line which in 
turn caused the plaintiff to swerve off the road and collide 
into some rock outcroppings. 
The evidence which was admitted at trial was a video 
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tape of the road before the segment where the accident 
actually occurred, as seen from the inside of a car, at a 
different speed than was actually travelled by the parties, 
and of segments of the road that were not involv€»d in the 
accident. It is clear that the section of road before the 
accident scene does not establish the fact of tightness, 
elevation, or visual impairments of the relevant curve. 
Hypothetically, a road could be flat for miles and then at a 
specific section steeply climb, or straight and then suddenly 
curve to the right or left. The "general characteristics" of 
the preceding road does not have any "tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." 
The defendants originally sought admission of the 
above mentioned video, as well as another similar video, to 
support their theory that the plaintiff misperceived the 
defendant coming over the center line, because of a claimed 
optical illusion. Defendant's expert testified as to this 
optical illusion theory created by the bend in the road at the 
segment where the accident occurred. However, the jury was 
shown a video tape which was:: filmed from a different 
elevation than that seen by the plaintiff on his motorcycle; 
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from a different position in the road; at a different speed 
than that traveled by the parties; and not the segment of the 
road where this proposed optical illusion occurred. The jury, 
in the present case, was asked to determine whether the 
defendant crossed the center line and was therefore negligent. 
Showing the jury the section of the road that was not involved 
in the accident misled the jury by creating, in their minds, 
a strongly emphasized and inaccurate picture of what the road 
looked like to the plaintiff, than that which the plaintiff 
actually perceived. 
The above mentioned variations such as the 
difference in elevation that the video was filmed from and 
different sections of road than actually confronted by the 
parties at the time of the accident, created a perception 
completely different than that confronted by the parties. In 
Ortiz v. State. 30 Fla. 256, 267, 11 So. 611, 613 (1892), an 
early case that dealt with photographs taken from a distorted 
angle, such evidence was excluded. The court reasoned that 
this distorted evidence "could have been of no assistance to 
the jury in the case, but would have served as an agency of 
confusion." This same confusion occurred in the case at bar 
when such evidence was admitted; the segments did not aid the 
trier of fact, but rather confused the jury as to what the 
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parties actually viewed when the accident occurred. 
Defendant's own expert testified that an increase of as little 
as one foot in elevation can equate to a ten foot difference 
in perception. (Please Abstract from Transcript of Trial: 
Hearing held on February 13, page 48, line 20-25) 
Furthermore, these segments of the Duval video were 
admitted to show the same type of curve that was involved in 
the accident. The court allowed this misleading evidence ,fas 
illustrative of the roadway, the type of a road, generally the 
type of a curve." (Ibid at page 41, line 6-12) However, it 
has been determined in other sister states that photographic 
evidence which is taken of a location other than the relevant 
scene, and used as illustrative of that scene must be 
substantially similar to the actual location. In Johnson v. 
State, 636 P.2d 47, 68 (Alaska 1981), the court reasoned that 
dissimilar photographic evidence is misleading, and 
prejudicial, and failure to excluded such evidence is 
reversible error. 
In the case at bar there was no effort by the trial 
court or defense counsel to determine whether the curves 
depicted in the segments of video are substantially similar to 
the s-curve where the accident occurred. Also, in closing 
arguments the defendant stressed his theory that as the 
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plaintiff approached the curve where the accident occurred 
"his tendency would be to be towards the middle of the road," 
and he therefore could not see approaching traffic and did not 
have time to see the defendant crossing over the center line 
and react as claimed• In emphasizing this theory, the 
defendant alluded to the video-taped curves in the road and 
changes in elevation. (See Defendant's Closing Arguments, 
page 7, line 10-21). This misled the jury as to what the 
parties actually saw, served to prejudice the plaintiff by 
groundlessly supporting the defendant's theory and directly 
contradicted the plaintiff's own testimony, which was crucial 
to the plaintiff's case. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENSE COUNSEL TO 
PURPOSELY SOLICIT THE INJECTION OF EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
HAD RECEIVED WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS FROM THE ACCIDENT 
IN QUESTION. 
It is well accepted in this state that generally 
questions concerning insurance are immaterial and should not 
be admitted into trial. "We do not depart from our former 
position: that the question of insurance is immaterial and 
should not be injected into the trial." Robinson v. Hreinson, 
409 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1965). Those courts who have 
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addressed this issue have focused their attention on the 
detrimental effect knowledge of the defendant having liability 
insurance has on the decision of a jury. It is proposed that 
the jury's inclination is to base their decision as to 
liability upon their sympathy for the plaintiff without any 
restraint as to the financial burden upon the defendant. 
This same concern is equally applicable to the 
plaintiff when knowledge of injuries suffered by the plaintiff 
are in fact covered by insurance, or in the case at bar by 
workers' compensation, and evidence of already received 
benefits are admitted. Such knowledge eviscerates in the 
juror's minds the need to compensate the injured party. Also, 
the introduction of such a collateral source instills in the 
mind of the jury the further prejudicial idea that the 
plaintiff will be doubly compensated for his injuries. 
Allowing opposing counsel to introduce such evidence 
prejudices the plaintiff both as to liability amd as to 
damages. 
This is a case of first impression in this 
jurisdiction, however, some sister states have thoroughly 
examined whether the introduction of evidence by the defendant 
about the plaintiff receiving workers' compensation benefits 
is prejudicial, immaterial and reversible. 
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The Montana Supreme Court held that admission of 
evidence concerning workers' compensation was reversible error 
and warranted a new trial. 
This court has specifically determined that in a 
personal injury action the prejudicial impact of 
allowing a jury to receive evidence of plaintiff's 
pending workers' compensation claim vastly 
outweighs the probative value of such evidence. 
Allers v. Willis, 643 P.2d 592, 39 St. Rep. 745 
(Mont. 1982) The court ruled in Allers that 
evidence of the workers' compensation claim was 
clearly inadmissable, quoting the following passage 
from an annotation: 
Generally, it has been held to constitute 
error, requiring a reversal or new trial, 
to bring to the jury's attention the fact 
that the plaintiff in a personal injury 
or death action is entitled to workmen's 
compensation benefits. The courts have 
reasoned that such information would tend 
to prejudice the jury and influence their 
verdict, either as to liability or 
damages, as such information is 
ordinarily immaterial and irrelevant. 77 
A.L.R. 2d at 1156. 
Admission of this evidence [evidence of received 
workers' compensation benefits] was reversible 
error and requires a new trial. 
Mydlarz v. Palmer/Duncan Const. Co.. 682 P.2d 695, 703 (Mont. 
1984). 
These are other jurisdictions which have addressed 
this issue and found similarly: 
Jarrel v. Woodland Mfg. Co. , 7 Ohio App. 3d 320, 455 
N.E. 2d 1015 (1982) : The court determined that the trial court 
erred in permitting testimony regarding the plaintiff's 
receipt of workers' compensation benefits for his injuries, 
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even for the limited purpose of proving that the plaintiff had 
diminished incentive to work. This evidence was elicited 
during cross-examination, and a new trial was granteid. 
Duffek v. Vanderhei. 81 111. App. 3d 1078, 401 N.E. 
2d 1145 (1980): The court reaffirmed the states longstanding 
principle that "It is well established that evidence that a 
plaintiff filed a workmen's compensation claim or received 
benefits is highly prejudicial and may not be introduced in a 
jury trial." 
Bibbv v. Hilstrom, 260 Or. 267, 490 P.2d 161 (1971) : 
The court held that it was reversible error to allow the 
injection of evidence as to recovered workers' compensation 
benefits both in pleadings and during trial. The court also 
cited Strandholm v. General Const. Co., 235 Or. 145, 382 P.2d 
843 (1963) , where the court held that intentional injection of 
evidence as to workers' compensation was prejudicial and 
reversible error. 
In the instant case, while cross-examining the 
plaintiff, the defendant's counsel clearly sought to inject 
evidence about workers' compensation coverage subsequent, but 
related to the accident in question. (Please see Abstract 
From Transcript of Trial: Comprising the Cross Examination of 
Douglas E. Butts, page 15, line 10-25 and page 16, line 1-7) 
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Defense counsel asked whether the plaintiff worked for Ray 
Butts Construction in February of 1990 as an employee, when 
defense counsel knew that the plaintiff had testified under 
oath in deposition that he was not employed by Ray Butts 
Construction nor any other employer since the above mentioned 
accident occurred; with the exception of personal wood-
working, the defendant testified that he has been unemployed 
since the 1987 accident. (See Plaintiff's Deposition 1, page 
47, line 24 through page 48. line 10; Deposition 2, page 7, 
line 1-8; page 20, line 14-23; Deposition 3, page 18-20; page 
20, line 12-19; page 22, line 4-7) 
The plaintiff answered that he did not work for Ray 
Butts Construction. Defense counsel then asked the plaintiff 
if he had filed a workers' compensation claim during February, 
1990, knowing that he had filed this claim and that it was 
filed in connection with the 1987 accident. (See Appendix A) 
Notwithstanding defense counsel's knowledge of the 
Plaintiff's clearly apparent unemployed status, defense 
counsel's line of questioning was further disingenuous in that 
counsel was fully aware of the extent of the plaintiff's 
injuries and physical disability, and knew that his condition 
made it impossible, at the time the claim was filed, to 
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continue as an employee of Ray Butts Construction. (See 
Plaintiff's Deposition 2, page 7, line 1-8; page 35, line 19 
through page 36, line 2; page 37, line 22-35; Deposition 3, 
page 5, line 3-5; page 6, line 15-23; page 11, line 7-12; page 
20, line 12-19) 
Plaintiff's counsel, seeing the direction and 
possible prejudice that could result if information as to 
already recovered workers' compensation benefits were to reach 
the jury, sought to preclude such evidence from being admitted 
by objecting and requesting a side bar conference as to 
defense counsel's line of questioning. (Please see Abstract 
From Transcript of Trial: Comprising the Cross Examination of 
Douglas E. Butts, page 15, line 10-25; Abstract From 
Transcript of Trial: comprising proceedings had outside the 
presence of the jury, page 9, line 17-22) 
Defense counsel was warned by plaintiff's counsel, 
at side bar, that this line of questioning would inevitably 
elicit evidence connecting the workers' compensation claim, 
which defense counsel introduced, and benefits already 
received with the 1987 accident. The judge allowed defense 
counsel to continue. Having answered that he was not employed 
with Ray Butts Construction during February, 1990, the 
plaintiff was faced with the ambiguous perception created by 
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defense counsel's question as to whether he had filed a claim 
as an employee during this time. Rather than allowing himself 
to be perceived as dishonest, the plaintiff was compelled to 
answer that he had filed such a claim, but that he was 
unemployed during this time and the claim was filed as a 
residual effect of the 1987 accident. Forewarned of the 
information that would be, and was, elicited from this line of 
questioning, defense counsel purposely sought to solicit this 
immaterial and irrelevant information, which prejudicially and 
adversely affected the plaintiff. (Ibid at page 15 line 10 
through page 16 line 7) 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT 
INDICATING AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY. 
The court erred in excluding evidence of defendant's 
change of liability insurance after the accident while still 
in mid-policy. Evidence as to liability insurance is 
generally inadmissable. See Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 
121, 123 (1965); See also Point I. However, it is well 
accepted that this rule is not exclusive, and different 
jurisdictions have legislatively or judicially established 
numerous exceptions. 
Notwithstanding the general rule against the 
introduction of evidence suggesting or implying 
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that the defendant is protected by liability 
insurance, the suggestion of the possession of 
insurance will not be avoided at the cost of 
suppressing evidence material to the establishment 
of a cause of action and the liability of a 
defendant sued for damages, or to show bias or 
prejudice of a witness. 
Annot., Admissabilitv of evidence, and propriety and effect of 
questions, comments, etc. tending to show that defendant in 
personal injury or death action carries liability insurance, 
4 A.L.R. 2d 761 (1949)(Emphasis added). 
In addition to Rule 411, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1991), which provides for exceptions to the above mentioned 
rule, the courts in this jurisdiction have addressed and 
accepted one other exception. Testimony showing that a 
defendant is covered by liability insurance is admissible when 
a reference to insurance is a part of an admission of 
liability or responsibility. Re id v. Owens, 93 P. 2d 680 
(1939); Gittens v. Lundbera, 284 P.2d 1115 (1955). 
The above mentioned courts reasoned that the 
possible prejudicial impact of evidence indicating the 
existence of liability insurance was outweighed by the 
probative value of the evidence indicating admitted liability; 
the two of which were inseparably intertwined. 
In the case at bar, the defendant changed automobile 
insurance from one company to another three weeks after the 
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relevant accident. It is the plaintiff's theory that the 
defendant quickly changed insurance companies to prevent the 
imminent repercussions of his negligence; namely, that his 
being at fault would lead to higher premiums or cancellation 
of his already high risk policy; this change was made while 
the defendant was in mid-policy. (See Abstract From 
Transcript of Trial: comprising testimony and arguments on 
motions held outside the presence of the jury, February 14, 
1991, page 2, line 24, 25; page 3, line 1) 
Initially the defendant denied having quickly 
switched policies after the accident, and he maintained that 
it was several months before he made the change. (Ibid at 
page 5, line 1-3) However, upon cross-examination the 
defendant conceded that it was three weeks rather than three 
months, and he also conceded that he and his wife had 
discussed this change during this short time. (Ibid, at page 
5, line 10-15) 
Plaintiff's theory is further supported by evidence 
which disproves the defendant's alleged motivation for 
switching insurance policies in such a hasty manner. The 
defendant claimed that he switched insurance companies because 
of lower premiums. While testimony did prove that the 
defendant's policy with Allstate, the initial policy, was 
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higher than the State Farm policy, it was revealed that the 
defendant was insured under a higher risk policy through 
Allstate Indemnity, an affiliate of Allstate which deals 
exclusively with high risk policies. (Ibid, at page 17, line 
2-6) 
The evidence indicates that the defendant, had he 
given his present insurer correct information regarding 
previous accidents, would not have been given a lower rate 
than he already possessed. Also, if his driving record was 
reevaluated by Allstate as being clear of any further 
accidents or moving violations, Allstate would have reassigned 
him to the lower risk company and his rates would then be less 
than the present State Farm policy which the defendant 
acquired. (Ibid, at page 18-28) This conduct, although not 
verbally expressed, is an admission of liability, and is so 
intertwined with evidence of liability insurance that it 
appropriately fits within the exception set forth in Reid v. 
Owens, 93 P.2d 680 (1939). Excluding this admission of 
liability clearly prejudices the plaintiff, and restricts him 
from presenting evidence as to the defendant's liability and 
warrants a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff was prejudiced both as to liability 
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and as to damages by the admission of the irrelevant and 
misleading video segments, by the court allowing defense 
counsel to pursue a line of questioning which counsel knew 
would result in the injection of prejudicial information 
concerning already received workers1 compensation benefits, 
and by the court excluding crucial evidence regarding an 
admission of liability by the defendant. For the 
above reasons, severally or cumulatively, the defendant was 
prejudiced and a new trial should be granted. 
DATED AND SIGNED this Q^ clay _of July, 1991. 
-JEFF^Y'C ."PEATROSS 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
A. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401 (1971, as 
amended) 
B. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402 (1974 as 
amended) 
C. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 (1991) 
D. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 411 (1991) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (1953, as amended) 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (1953, as amended) 
APPENDIX A 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable 
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evi-
dence (1971), but the former rule defined rele-
vant evidence as that having a tendency to 
prove or disprove the existence of any "mate-
rial fact" Avoiding the use of the term "mate-
rial fact" accords with the application given to 
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court. 
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of remoteness. 
Cited. 
Effect of remoteness. 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 
1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747 
P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct App. 1988); Fisher ex rel. 
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct App. 
1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 
(Utah Ct App. 1988); State v. Wortlien, 765 
P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Mauier, 770 
P.2d 981 (Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777 
P.2d 532 (Utah Ct App. 1989); Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 F.2d 920 
(Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78. 
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific 
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah 
L. Rev. 839. 
1 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of 
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974) except that prior to the word 
Statute" the words "Constitution of the United 
States" have been added. 
Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also 
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state 
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974). 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice*9 as contained in Rule 402 
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise." 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the Mowing 
Utah cases to the same effect Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appeara to be the correct reference. 
Crosa-Referencea. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Rule 411. Liability insurance. 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not ad-
missible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. 
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against 
liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, 
or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is inson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 
the federal rule, verbatim. The provisions of 121 (1965); Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50,93 P.2d 
this rule are comparable to Rule 54, Utah 680 (1939). 
Rules of Evidence (1971) and case law. Cf. Rob-
78-3-4. Jurisdiction - Transfer of cases to circuit court -
Appeals [Effective until January 1, 1988J. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimi-
«Qi not pvrpnted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
^ K f t ? « * 3 S w « as ifthe — . " ! - J - - « a | S f g S ? S S in the circuit court and any appeals from final judgments shall be to the won 
°
f
 ( S a l s from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district 
court are under §1 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) frnul orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS E. BUTTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY LANEY, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No. CV-87-1954 
Hon. cullen Y. Christensen 
This matter, having come on regularly before the 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, and the Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen having found that this matter was tried to a jury 
between the dates of February 11, 1991 and February 14, 1991, 
and the plaintiff having been represented by R. Phil Ivie and 
Jeffery Peatross, and the defendant having been represented by 
Nelson L. Hayes and George T. Naegle and that the jury returned 
a special verdict answering questions 3 and 4 as follows: 
3. At the time and place of the incident in 
question and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, 
was Gary Laney negligent? 
Yes No X 
4. Was such negligence a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries? 
Yes No X 
The Court, having reviewed the special verdict form 
and for good cause showing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the plaintiff Douglas E. Butts' cause of 
action against the defendant Gary Laney be dismissed with 
prejudice and upon the merits and that a verdict of no cause of 
action be entered against the plaintiff Douglas E. Butts. 
2. That the defendant Gary Laney, be awarded 
costs in the amount of $ . 
DATED this £" day of ^V/Llst-/- , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailedJay first class, postage 
prepaid, this Jl& day of hf/9- 1991 to the following: 
R. Phil Ivie 
Jeffery C. Peatross 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS E . BUTTS, 
Pla int i f f and 
Appellant, 
v s . 
GARY LANEY and EAGLE SYSTEMS 
INTERNATIONAL, and EAGLE 
MARKETING CORPORATION, 
Defendants and 
Appellees. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. CV-87-1954 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
COMES NOW the plaintiff and appellant, Douglas E. 
Butts, by and through his attorney R. Phil Ivie, and appeals 
to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment rendered in the 
above-entitled matter on the 5th day of March, 1991. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED AND SIGNED this ^ 'day 
R. PHILylVIE-^' 
IVIE &/YOUNG 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, with postage prepaid 
thereon, this ^ - ^ d a y of April, 1991, to the following: 
Nelson L. Hayes 
Richards, Brandt, Miller 
& Nelson 
50 South Main #700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, DT 84110 
Robert Henderson 
Snow, Chirstensen 
& Martineau 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Sal-t Lake City, DT 
K 0 
84145 
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